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Researchers find vulnerabilities in the built-in browsers of Cursor, Copilot, Claude Desktop, VS Code and Codex

Prepared by Sintelligent with the help of SI. Published in SI: . Updated: .

The built-in browser becomes part of an agent's security system: its excessive permissions can turn opening an HTML file into theft of a developer's keys and files.

Forever Security showed that the expanded capabilities of built-in browsers break the usual isolation model: in Cursor a malicious page could run code on the computer through a hidden injection, in GitHub Copilot it could spoof the address bar, and in Claude Desktop, VS Code and Codex a local HTML file could read other files. Cursor fixed the vulnerability on October 1, and GitHub patched Copilot in version 1.1.29 released on October 13. As of October 29, the file-reading issues in Codex and VS Code remained unfixed. OpenAI told The Register it is working on a fix for Codex. Anthropic and Microsoft initially rejected the reports, citing the Workspace Trust security boundary; the researchers respond that without trust in the project the agent is practically unusable, so such a prompt does not protect the user.